About
I am a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at COGITO Epistemology Research Centre, University of Glasgow and a Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg. I did a PhD as a Fulbright scholar in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. Before that, I completed an MA in Philosophy at Univerdad de los Andes (Bogotá, Colombia) and before that I received a BA in Philosophy from the Universidad de Antioquia (Medellín, Colombia).
I work in epistemology and have side research interests at the intersection of epistemology and moral responsibility. My current research covers various subfields of epistemology, including social epistemology. One focus is the epistemology of ignorance, where I develop strategies to explain ignorance as inherently agential. My interest in epistemic agency has led me to be interested in epistemic nudges and epistemically suboptimal forms of persuasion. As a UC Irvine alumnus, it is no surprise that I also have an interest in Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.
Publications
- Can A.I. Believe? (w/ J. Adam Carter)
Philosophy and Technology (Forthcoming) - Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 102 (3), 468-490. (2021). - Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Epistemic Relativism?
Synthese, 199, 4645-4671. (2021).
In Progress and Under Review
- A few papers on ignorance: its analysis (R&R); its relationship with autonomous
belief (w/ J. Adam Carter) (R&R); its mephysical nature as a negative state;
the puzzle that social constructionism poses to our understanding of white ignorance;
and what it means to act from ignorance. - A paper (w/ M. Vermaire) on the epistemology of nudges, in which we provide an
account of doxastic and epistemic nudges that can do important explanatory work (R&R). - A paper (w/ S. Schmidt) on hinge epistemology and suspension of judgment, where we
address the gap in hinge epistemology concerning the justification for suspending judgment. - A paper proposing a version of the modal account of luck that avoids problems that existing
modal views of luck face and come from Lackey’s Buried Treasure cases. - A paper on the moral luck problem: I argue, from within the so-called modal account of luck,
that in order to solve the moral luck problem paradox we should accept the phenomenon
of moral luck. This, in turn, doesn’t make moral responsibility evaluations unfair or inappropriate.
Selected presentations
Peer Reviewed
- “Suspension, Hinge Style” (with S. Schmidt) (2024). New Waves in Hinge Epistemology.
University of Glasgow - “Ignorance and Negativity” (2024). World Congress of Philosophy, Rome
- “Is Ignorance a Failure?” (2023). 2nd Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers Workshop.
University of St. Andrews - “Ignorance, Access, and Epistemic Responsibility” (2022). 11th Vienna Forum
for Analytic Philosophy Graduate Conference. University of Vienna. - “The Modal Moral Luck Problem” (2022). Beyond Free Will. Vilnius University, Lithuania.
- “Ignorance, Access, and Epistemic Responsibility” (2022). Workshop for Young Researchers
of the Francophone Society for Analytic Philosophy. University of Geneva. - “Ignorance, Excuses, and Modality” (2021). APA Pacific Division Meeting.
- “Ignorance Isn’t Modal” (2021). APA Eastern Division Meeting.
- “Ignorance and Epistemic Luck. Or Why Ignorance is not Lack of Knowledge” (2020).
Workshop on Luck, Risk and Competence. Universidad de Sevilla, Spain.
Invited
- “Ignorancia en la Epistemología”. (2024)
Coloquio de investigación. Universidad de los Andes, Colombia. - “Nudging for Judging that p” (with Matthew Vermaire) (2023)
Epistemic Autonomy Workshop. University of Glasgow - “Why Ignorance isn’t a Failure of Inquiry” (2023)
Normativity Colloquium. University of Zurich - “Epistemología de la ignorancia: normatividad y suerte epistémica” (2023)
VI Jornada de Filosofía de la Mente.
Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia - “Epistemología de Bisagra y (anti)relativismo” (2021). VII Seminario en Historia y
Filosofía de la Ciencia: Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín, Colombia. - “Suerte Epistémica e injusticia epistémica” (2020) Desacuerdo e
Injusticia Epistémica. Universidad EAFIT, Medellin Colombia. - “Ignorance, Lack of Knowledge, and Excuses” (2020). A Socially Distant
Open Topic Conference. University of California, Irvine
Contact
Email: Oscar.PiedrahitaRivera@glasgow.ac.uk
Philosophy, School of Humanities
69 Oakfield Avenue
Room 313
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, UK G12 8QQ